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THE RIGHT TO RENOUNCE ELECTION
TO TAKE UNDER A WILL
Arkansas. In the case of Townson v. Townson1 the principal
question was whether a widow, after having filed a declaration of
her decision to take under her husband's will, may later change
her mind and elect to renounce the will. The widow bad filed an
instrument with the probate clerk in which she declared that with
full knowledge of her right to a larger share in the estate, she
elected to take only that property left to her by her husband's will.
However, by a second pleading filed within the time limit allowed
by statute for making an election,2 she undertook to rescind her
earlier action and renounced the will, alleging that her election was
not binding upon her as a matter of law and that her signature to
the first instrument was obtained by fraud. The trial court over-
ruled a demurrer to the issue of fraud and allowed proof of this
issue to come into evidence. The court, however, made no express
finding upon the question of fraud and entered judgment that she
was entitled to renounce her prior election.
On appeal the supreme court compared the situation in this case
with the converse situation - that is, where the will is first re-
nounced and then an election to take under the will is made. This
latter situation is covered by statute3 as follows:
An election made by or on behalf of a surviving spouse to take
against the will shall be binding and shall not be subject to revocation,
1 ------------ Ark ------------ 254 S.W. 2d 952 (1953).
2 ARK. STAT. 1947 ANN. (1953 Supp.) § 60-503: "The election by a surviving spouse
to take against the will may be made at any time within one month after the expiration
of the time limited for the filing of claims... ." In the portion of the statute (§62-1001)
pertinent to the time limit for filing claims, the administrator or executor is required
to publish notice that letters testamentary have been granted him and that any person
having claims must file them within six months from the date of first publication of
notice or else be barred and precluded from any benefits in the estate.
3ARK. STAT. 1947 ANN. (1953 Supp.) § 60-506.
[Vol. 8
1954] SURVEY OF SOUTHWESTERN LAW FOR 1953 367
except within the time provided by Section 354 for filing an election
and prior to any distribution made on the basis of such election....
The supreme court reasoned first that since the statutory provisions
for revoking an election to take against the will were very lib-
eral, it was the intention of the legislature to permit the widow
to choose which course would be best suited to her interests with
the fullest information possible. Secondly, it was stated to be plain
that if the widow is free to revoke her original renunciation of
the will, then she should be "equally free to rescind her relatively
unimportant decision to take under the will." Therefore, the su-
preme court affirmed the trial court and held that the widow had
the right to rescind her election unless a distribution had been
made under the will in reliance on her election.
There is a broad principle of equity running through many
fields of the law to the effect that a person upon whom inconsistent
rights are conferred has the right to choose which of these rights
he will take but that he cannot have both.' This right to choose
between inconsistent rights is known as election.6 It arises in the
case of wills where the testator attempts to deprive the surviving
spouse of rights given her by law; or attempts to dispose of prop-
erty free from another's interest and to give in return a right or
interest in property in which the other would otherwise have no
interest. 7 In this situation the devisee or legatee is bound to make
an election either to accept the provision in the will or retain that
which is already his own.' An election may be inferred from the
acts or conduct of a person as by the acceptance of benefits given
in a will,9 or it may be made expressly by some unequivocal act
of the party accompanied by language showing the intention to
4Quoted in note 2 supra.
5 4 PACE, WILLS (3d ed. 1941) § 1346.
6 Ibid.
74 PAG , WILLS (3d ed. 1941) §§ 1347, 1358.
8 Id., § 1347.
9 Id., § 1366.
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
elect.'" Thus, the fact of an express election may be shown by the
execution of a written instrument declaring the election."
With the foregoing as a background, the general rule may be
stated that an unconditional voluntary election to take under or
contrary to a valid will cannot be revoked or set aside when made
with knowledge of the facts and of the rights of the person making
the election, and when not induced by fraud or undue influence. 2
With the factors of fraud or undue influence out of the picture, the
rule is based upon the knowledge of the person electing. Of course,
when the election is made upon an incomplete set of facts or upon
a false assumption, there is no basis for holding the person to his
election. But if facts adequate to make an intelligent and dis-
criminating election are before the person together with a knowl-
edge of his rights and the effects of his election, the courts gen-
erally hold him bound by his election.13 This election is binding
also upon those parties who claim under him, his heirs and per-
sonal representatives. 4
The Arkansas statute requires that a revocation of an election
must be made within the time allowed for filing an election and
prior to any distribution made on the basis of the election.1" How-
ever, up until the present case the line of decisions in Arkansas
appears to have followed in strict conformity with the general rule
in refusing to permit revocation of an election once made with
knowledge of the facts. The rule was stated in the case of Goodrum
v. Goodrum'6 in the following words:
An election once made, under circumstances which show that the
party required to elect had, or might, by the exercise of reasonable
diligence, have had, such information, in regard to the relative value
of those things between which a choice must be made, as would enable
10 2 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (5th ed. 1941) § 514.
11 Ibid.
12 Id., § 519b.
1a Williams v. Williams, 114 Fla. 733, 154 So. 835 (1934).
142 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (5th ed. 1941) § 516.
15 Quoted at note 3 supra.
10 56 Ark. 532, 20 S.W. 353, 354 (1892).
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the party making the election to make an intelligent and discriminating
choice, cannot be retracted.
In the Goodrum case a widow filed suit within the statutory time
limit claiming her dower interest at law instead of the provision in
the husband's will bequeathing her a policy of insurance on his
life. At the time the proceeds were collected and paid to her, she
understood that the bequest was in lieu of dower and was also
fully advised of her legal rights. The court held that, although she
had never given any receipt for these proceeds and had never ex-
pressed either in words or in writing that it was her purpose to
make an election, such an election was naturally and legitimately
to be inferred. However, an inventory or statement of her husband's
estate had not been made at the time she accepted the money, and
the court permitted the election to be revoked on the ground she had
not had the information necessary to enable her to make an intel-
ligent and discriminating choice between the bequest in the will
and her dower interest.
A similar situation arose in the case of Cypert v. McEuen,"1
wherein the widow also brought suit within the statutory time limit
for her dower interest after having elected to take under the will
of her husband. The will had bequeathed her a portion of the hus-
band's personal estate, but here, as a distinction from the Goodrum
case, the widow on receiving payment under the will executed a
receipt by which she acknowledged that the payment was made
pursuant to the terms of the will and agreed to accept its terms.
An inventory of the estate had not been filed by the executor at the
time the widow elected to take under the will, but she knew of the
amount of money her husband had when he died, for she had pos-
session of the deposit slips and had delivered them to the executor.
Further, she had ample opportunity to inquire and obtain advice
as to her rights under the law, and there was no intimation in the
record that she was misled or deceived as to her rights. The court
found the widow had the requisite knowledge for making an elec-
17 172 Ark. 437, 288 S.W. 923 (1926).
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tion and, therefore, she was not permitted to revoke her election
to take under the will.
Again, the Arkansas Supreme Court followed the rules as to
election laid down in the Goodrum case in the later case of
McEachin v. Peoples National Bank."8 The widow, as sole benefi-
ciary under a will except for a small bequest, had negotiated with
and bought her brother-in-law's interest in a partnership owned
jointly by him and her deceased husband. The unpaid balance of
the partnership interest was covered by notes executed by the widow.
When the obligation came due, she attempted to revoke her elec-
tion to take under the will and to claim her dower rights at law.
One of the main questions on appeal was whether the widow had
renounced the will and elected to take the rights given by law
within the time allowed by statute. t9 However, the court refused to
settle this question and, setting up the above quoted statement of
law from the Goodrum case as the test, held that the widow had
elected to take under the will with the knowledge necessary to
make a choice, and, therefore, the election was irrevocable.
It is interesting to note the striking similarities between the
Townson case and the Goodrum, Cypert and McEachin cases rep-
resenting the prior line of decisions in Arkansas. First, there was
a widow in each case who had, either by acts or express written
statements, elected to take under her husband's will and was later
attempting to revoke the election and claim dower rights at law.
Secondly, the suits to revoke the election were all filed within the
statutory time limit for filing elections with the possible exception
of the McEachin case, and there the court expressly left the ques-
18191 Ark. 544, 87 S.W. 2d 12 (1935).
19 Prior to 1949, a widow under ARK. STAT. 1947 ANN. § 61-219 had twelve months
from the death of her husband in which to file an election to take her dower interest
where the will devised her lands or a pecuniary interest, but under § 61-225, if the will
devised lands, the widow bad eighteen months within which to elect. The widow in the
McEachin case filed her election after twelve months but before eighteen months, and
the question of whether her election was timely filed depended upon the nature of the
property devised by the will. These two statutes, §§ 61-219 and 61-225, have been re-
pealed by § 60-503, quoted in note 2 supra.
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tion undecided. And thirdly, in all but the Goodrum case the per-
sons bound to elect had the knowledge necessary to enable them
to choose which right to accept and which to reject.
From the reported opinion of the Townson case it cannot be
determined what influence, if any, the allegations and evidence
of fraud had on the supreme court's affirmance of the trial court
holding. Certainly, if fraud had been used in inducing the widow
to sign the instrument declaring the election, the court could have
found ample authority to support a decision allowing her to re-
scind the election.2" On the other hand, absent the element of fraud,
the court could have supported a decision holding the widow
bound to her election not only by earlier decisions of its own but
by the general view because of her express election declaring
knowledge of the right to a larger share in the estate. Fraud ap-
pears to have been no factor here, however, since the trial court
made no express finding of fraud and because the supreme court
described the filing of an election to take under a will as being
''relatively unimportant."
The Townson case is made conspicuous by the complete absence
of citations on the point under discussion. But even though prior
cases are not distinguished, the court's decision appears clearly
to be a departure from the long standing Arkansas rule to the
effect that an election made with the knowledge necessary to an
intelligent and discriminating choice binds a party to his election.
Such a decision has much in its favor though, for if no distribu-
tion has been made in reliance on the widow's election so that a
revocation would do harm to innocent third parties, then permit-
ting the election to be revoked merely allows generous latitude to
the widow in making a choice.
20 4 PAGE, WILLS (3d ed. 1941) § 1385.
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ELECTION WHEN SURVIVING SPOUSE
IS MENTALLY INCOMPETENT
Oklahoma. The case of Turner v. First National Bank & Trust
Co. of Muskogee21 presented the question - apparently one of
first impression in Oklahoma - of whether a court having juris-
diction over the estate of a mentally incompetent surviving spouse
is bound to elect for the incompetent survivor to take under the
law rather than the will when such an election will result in a
greater pecuniary benefit to the survivor.
The incompetent surviving spouse, the widow, and the deceased
had been married almost 50 years at the time of his death. The
evidence revealed that theirs had been a most harmonious mar-
riage, both of them having a deep affection of each other, like in-
terests, like business ingenuity, and like sentiments toward char-
ities. For example, the deceased, because he wanted his wife to
have as much as he, had given the surviving incompetent during
their marriage an estate equal to his own, which amounted to ap-
proximately $600,000. She, to show her gratitude towards him,
had executed a will leaving her entire estate to him in the event
she should predecease him. Further to illustrate their similar atti-
tudes, the incompetent had attended Bacone College as a girl, and
afterwards, she, as well as her husband, who was not a former
student, had contributed generously to the college and to deserv-
ing students attending the college. Some time prior to her hus-
band's death, she suffered a stroke which left her mentally incom-
petent, and from this condition there was no hope of recovery
because of her advanced age of over 80 years.
The will of the deceased devised to his surviving spouse a one-
half interest in his estate, and the remainder was devised to Bacone
College, except for a life estate in a particular piece of property
given to his wife's caretaker. Since no children had been born of
the marriage and there were no ascendants, or brothers and sis-
ters living, the surviving spouse was her husband's sole heir and
21 ------------ Okla ------------ 262 P. 2d 897 (1953).
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under the succession statute22 entitled to the entire estate. Thus,
by virtue of the forced heir statute21 she had a right of election be-
cause the will gave her less than was provided for her by law.
Since she was incapable of making an election, her guardian acted
in her place and petitioned the county court to elect for her to take
under the law of succession and not under the will. The county
court elected for the incompetent spouse to take under the will,
and an appeal was taken to the district court where, after a trial
de novo, the same result was reached.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court in reaching a decision set up
several equitable considerations 24 to serve as guides for a court
22 84 OKLA. STAT. ANN. (Perm. ed.) § 213, Fifth: "If the decedent leave a surviving
husband or wife, and no issue, and no father, nor mother, nor brother, nor sister, the
whole estate goes to the surviving husband or wife."
23 84 OKLA. STAT. ANN. (Perm. ed) § 44: "Every estate in property may be dis-
posed of by will; . . . but no spouse shall bequeath or devise away from the other so
much of the estate of the testator that the other spouse would receive less in value
than would be obtained through succession by law .. " Under this statute it has been
held in Porter v. Hansen, 190 Okla. 429, 124 P. 2d 391 (1942), that a will giving to a
forced heir less than the heir would receive by inheritance is not void, but is merely
voidable as to the heir at his election. In another case construing this statute, Parnacher
v. Hawkins, 203 Okla. 387, 222 P. 2d 362 (1950), the court held that disinheritance,
whether intentional or unintentional, is positively forbidden and that the surviving
spouse is a forced heir to the extent that he or she would take under the law of
succession.
24 Apparently the court derived its equitable considerations from the cases of First
National Bank v. MacDonald, 100 Fla. 675, 130 So. 596 (1930), In re Harris' Estate,
351 Pa. 368, 41 A. 2d 715 (1945), and Van Steenwyck v. Washburn, 59 Wis. 483, 17
N.W. 289 (1883). The First National Bank v. MacDonald case listed several elements
as guides for a court, saying: "In determining what is for the best interest of the
afflicted widow, the chancellor will generally be influenced by these considerations:
(1) The husband's right to dispose of his estate is limited by the right given the
widow to renounce the provisions of the will in her behalf and take under the statute,
but the sole reason in law for giving the widow the right to renounce is to insure ample
provision for her personal needs and comforts. (2) Her personal needs and comforts
may not be confined to pure monetary considerations. (3) The matter of enriching the
widow's estate and passing something to her kinspeople has no place in the chancellor's
consideration. (4) The kinspeople of the wife have no claim direct or indirect on the
estate of the husband. (5) The fact that a permanently insane widow knows nothing
of the value of money, cannot use it with discretion and has no need for money nor
property save to furnish ample comforts and needs, may be considered. (6) It may also
be borne in mind that, when the husband has made ample provision for his insane
wife, he has an inherent right to dispose of his property as he pleases, provided the
disposition be not contrary to public policy." 130 So. at 599. In the case of In re
Harris' Estate the court said: "It is common knowledge that not every widow disregards
her husband's last wishes for the disposition of his property merely because she would
obtain a greater quantum of his estate by so doing; sentiment enters into such situa-
tions quite as much as considerations of material advantage. . . ." 41 A. 2d at 722.
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with jurisdiction over an incompetent's estate in making an elec-
tion for the incompetent survivor. First, the court considered
whether the means provided by the will were ample for her care
and comfort during the remainder of her life, since the primary
purpose of the law in giving a survivor the right of election is to
insure that ample care and comfort is provided. Of this there
could be no doubt, for she was over 80 years of age and had an
estate in her own right of $600,000 in addition to the approxi-
mately $300,000 devised to her by the will. Next, the relatives of
the incompetent spouse were briefly considered, but the court
stated that where the election is concerned with the estate of a
deceased husband in which the relatives have no claim, as in this
case, they were not to be considered in making the election. And
last, where the evidence showed that the incompetent had great
confidence in the deceased and like devotion to the other devisees
under the will, and bearing in mind that all widows do not dis-
regard the wishes of their husbands as expressed in their wills,
the court held that such evidence should have great weight in de-
termining the election to take under the will. Therefore, the Okla-
homa Supreme Court, following the uniform line of decisions in
this country,25 upheld the county and district courts and held that
a court with jurisdiction over an incompetent's estate was not
bound to elect that the surviving incompetent take under the law
because such a choice would result in greater pecuniary benefits.
It is well settled in Oklahoma that where a husband by his will
gives his surviving spouse less than she would take under the law
of succession, she has a right to elect to take the share given by
law.26 Thus, where a surviving spouse elects to take under the law
of succession, the deceased spouse's will, although it may be valid
and subsisting as to all others, is invalid and non-existent as to
the surviving spouse.27 The forced heir statute makes no distinc-
tion in terms between competent and incompetent surviving spouses
254 PAGE, WILLS (3d ed. 1941) § 1363; 57 Am. JuR., Wills, §§ 1527, 1528.
26 See note 23 supra.
27 Dixon v. Dixon, 191 Okla. 139, 126 P. 2d 1020 (1942).
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but merely says that "no spouse shall bequeath or devise away
from the other so much of the estate of the testator that the other
spouse would receive less in value than would be obtained through
succession by law."2 Applying this statute to the facts of the pres-
ent case, it appears that if the widow were competent, she would
have an absolute right to elect to take against the will in spite of
her age and the extent of her personal estate. Then, does not the
holding in this case discriminate against incompetent survivors?
True, she was incapable herself of electing, and the guardian
could not make the election,29 but he had the duty to protect her
interests and petitioned the court in her behalf. Further, was not
the court indulging in judicial legislation by this holding? The court
effectively modified the absolute wording of the forced heir statute
so that in situations involving an incompetent survivor, it now
means that there is no absolute right of election. Instead, a court
with jurisdiction over the incompetent's estate may exercise its
discretion and is not bound to elect to take against the will even
though it would result in a greater pecuniary benefit to the incom-
petent. The answer to both of the questions posed would seem
to be "Yes."
As indicated above, the holding in the principal case is in
accord with the great weight of authority in this country. When
viewed from the standpoint of what decision will give the most
socially desirable result, it is difficult to offer any valid or worth-
while criticism. The incompetent survivor already had a consid-
erable estate, and this estate would have merely been increased if
the guardian's petition had been successful. She was over 80 years
of age and hopelessly insane. Therefore, balancing these factors
against the benefit which would be derived from using the estate
in suit to help educate needy students as well as to care for a faith-
ful servant during her remaining years, the court made the only
decision possible from a socially desirable point of view. Cer-
28 See note 23 supra.
29 25 Am. JuR., Guardian and Ward, § 104.
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tainly, the decision will not work a harm on incompetent survi-
vors, since the equitable considerations set up as guides permit
a court with jurisdiction over the incompetent's estate to elect to
take against the will when the circumstances warrant such an
election.
Samuel M. Mims, Jr.
